Reflections on a Unified Theory of
Motive

THEODORE EISENBERG*
Motive has come a long way since Palmer v. Thompson, and
United States v. O'Brien2 revived the notion that legislative motive is not a basis for invalidating official enactments. Recently,
writers seem to agree that motive should play some role in constitutional adjudication.3 Reason exists to believe that the Court itself concurs. 4 Professors Clark 5 and Simon6 now ably join this
consensus.
Even though motive may be relevant in assessing some constitutional claims, the question remains whether there are cases in
which motive should not be relevant. Professor Ely has suggested
that motive need not and should not be relevant in all cases
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pressed some of my views on this matter.8 Professor Clark's article again raises the question whether a line should be drawn, and
if so, where. 9
Initially, one might ask why we should try to draw a line between cases in which motive should matter and cases in which it
should not. Neither constitutional text nor formal logic mandates
such a line. One could hold that all unconstitutional motives are
judicially cognizable. The Court then would be left with the task
of deciding which motives are unconstitutional. There may well
be a case, however, for trying to draw a line. If in any particular
case resort to motive entails highly desirable consequences and
relatively minor undesirable consequences, a prima facie case for
using motive exists. At the other extreme, to the extent there are
undesirable consequences. and relatively minor gains, a prima facie case exists for ignoring motive. If the ends of the spectrum are
sufficiently distant from one another, the case for a line begins to
emerge.
Some potential adverse consequences of motive analysis are
apparent. As Professor Karst notes elsewhere in this Colloquium,
no decisionmaking body wishes to be told that its motives are sufficiently impure to require invalidation of its acts.lO Interbranch
tensions increase when judges examine official decisionmakers'
motives. Also, there is always the risk that a judge mistakenly will
attribute an illicit motive to the official decisionmaker. In such a
case, society may be deprived of an otherwise beneficial law because of judicial error. These two costs seem inherent in any system allowing review of official motives.
If given enough weight, these and other costs 1 may be sufficient to require important and otherwise unattainable benefits to
result from examination of motive. One unique benefit to be attained from scrutiny of all sufficiently "bad" motives exists. One
may not want a society in which there are statutes that would not
have been enacted but for bad reasons, and therefore one may desire a rule proscribing such statutes regardless of their effects. Although complete purity of process might be a goal worth
pursuing, it does suggest rather unrealistic standards. If one discards this general due process benefit,12 however, many situa8. Eisenberg, note 3 supra.
9. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamantal Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 1038-39 (1978).
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tions arise in which one is hard-pressed to point to any other
substantial benefit attending resort to motive. Nevertheless, some
important classes of cases in which analysis of motive yields important dividends remain. Space limitations permit outlining only
one example of a possible mode of analysis for isolating the cases
in which courts should examine motive.
Consider a state law that is within whatever substantive limits
the sixth amendment imposes on jury trials. If the statute is going
to fall, it must be because of motive. An enactment that exceeds
sixth amendment limits-a law abolishing trial by jury-would
fall regardless of the legislators' motives. An example I have
worked with before is a state law that allows six-person juries in
criminal cases.13 The Court upheld such a law in Williams v.
Florida.14
Let us make the unrealistic assumptions that one motive underlies the enactment and that it can be determined with whatever
certainty is deemed necessary. Assume also that one of the following can be deemed the motive of the legislature: (1) to make
the state's criminal justice system more efficient (this might be a
response to delay or to difficulty in finding twelve qualified jurors), (2) to increase the percentage of criminal trials resulting in
convictions, (3) to subvert the protection the sixth amendment
provides defendants (this hostility might accompany a feeling
that the Bill of Rights is too favorable to defendants), (4) to fulfill
an agreement with state prosecutors by which the legislators
agreed to vote for the law in exchange for payment by the prosecutors of $1,000 to the legislators, (5) to increase the likelihood of
convicting the notorious criminal, John Smith, or (6) to increase
the number of blacks or Quakers who are convicted.
One can deal with the first motive, facilitating the administration of justice, rather easily. Under no reasonable view of any constitutional provision is this motive tainted. A court will not
entertain the argument, by one who is tried by a six-person jury
(assuming a six-person jury is otherwise constitutional), that the
dress the process by which laws are enacted, as opposed to the fairness of procedures mandated by laws or to the substantive effects of laws, see Hazard,
Representation in Rule-making, in LAW AND THE AmERiCAN FUTURE 85 (M.

Schwartz ed. 1976); Linde, Due Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222-24,
238-44 (1976).
13. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 141-42 & n.497.
14. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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six-person requirement would not have been enacted but for the
legislature's desire to improve the administration of justice.
The second posited motive, achieving conviction of suspects in
a greater percentage of criminal cases, may be slightly more difficult to deal with. Some might assert it as permissible for a legislature to seek the conviction of more suspects as to seek the
improvement of criminal justice administration. If one follows this
view, no difficulty exists in refusing to use the second posited motive to invalidate legislation. One might argue, however, that the
sixth amendment and other constitutional limitations on criminal
procedure were designed to prevent legislatures from playing fast
and loose with procedure merely to achieve more convictions.
Under this view, consideration of the second motive would result
in greater fidelity to the Constitution. Should the Court allow use
of this motive? In approaching the problem, the Court might aslk
Given that resort to motive entails some costs, does the protection afforded by using this motive sufficiently outweigh these
costs? For the present, I am content to advocate the asking of the
question without attempting to answer it.
Even if one takes a generous view of the first two motives, a
court could not dismiss a claim alleging the third motive merely
on the ground that the third motive is permissible. A desire to
subvert the sixth amendment directly conflicts with constitutional
dictates. Admittedly, it is unlikely that many legislators will be
thinking in terms of exceeding a particular constitutional provision, but the horror stories one hears about how the Bill of Rights
might fare if put to public vote suggest the example is not so unrealistic. In addition, it is possible that the Court will view other
actual motives as the functional equivalents of a desire to exceed
sixth amendment limitations.15 In characterizing some federal social legislation as motivated by a desire to invade areas left by the
Constitution to the states, and in relying in part on this motive to
strike down such legislation, the Court has treated some motives
not necessarily cast in constitutional terms as the functional
equivalents of motives so framed.16 Under the proposed form of
analysis, the motive's impropriety requires that one examine relative costs and benefits of resort to motive. Would the greater fidelity to sixth amendment values be worth the costs? How much,
if any, of this increase would be unattainable by fine-tuning an effects test?
15. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (intent to deprive person of
constitutional rights inferred from acts even though it was unlikely that the defendant was thinking in constitutional terms).
16. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208 n.2 (1970).
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The fourth posited motive, that the six-person jury rule represents a response to bribes, raises the question whether a patently
reprehensible motive not in direct conflict with the Constitution
should provide a basis for invalidating legislation. Potential difficulties that might accompany an affirmative response readily
come to mind. May legislators realistically be expected not to pursue self-interest? Do citizens really want them not to do so? One
might distinguish among forms of self-interest on the ground that
some pursuits of self-interest are criminal (receiving bribes) but
others often are not (for example, voting for legislation favorable
to a business in which legislators have an interest). Alternatively,
motives relating to criminal pursuit of self-interest might lose
their favored candidacy because criminal laws could be said to represent society's judgment concerning both which motives should
be banned and how to effectuate the ban. But criminal penalties
do nothing to vindicate the interests of those claiming a right to
live in a society free of laws enacted for "bad" or for illegal reasons. The criminal legislators may be in jail, but the laws are on
the books. Is it frivolous to assert a due process claim in such
cases? These cases are, after all, defects in process. 17 Loosely
read, Fletcher v. Peckl8 may settle this issue, but rethinking the
matter may be in order.
The fifth posited motive, a desire to "get" John Smith, raises
questions under the ex post facto and bill of attainder clause.' 9 If
the legislature wishes to penalize Smith because of acts he previously has committed, and the new jury rule affects the trial for
the crimes these acts allegedly constitute, the law may be attacked under the ex post facto clause regardless of motive. The
attack would probably fail.20 Should the additional factor of the
anti-Smith motivation change the analysis? Respectable opinion
suggests that it might.21 This situation raises difficult questions
about the origins and the contemporary function of the ex post
facto and bill of attainder clause. It suffices for now to note that
if, for example, the ex post facto provision limits governmental
actions aimed at specific constituents, a strong and perhaps over17. See also note 12 supra.
18. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
20. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
21. E.g., id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting); L.
LAw 484 &n.10 (1978).
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whelming factor exists in favor of examining the anti-Smith motive. Unless the Coirt is willing to do so, it is impossible to
vindicate an important aspect of the ex post facto clause. No reasonable effects test can protect this interest.
The inability of effects tests to protect important equal protection and free exercise clause interests renders analysis of the
sixth posited motive relatively easy. Whatever detriments attend
resort to motive, given our history, they seem outweighed by the
need to protect individuals from racial and religious discrimination. Testing effects can only partly serve the need. A racial challenge to the firing of one teacher and perhaps the facts of Palmer
v. Thompson illustrate this principle. Increasing scrutiny of effects can never fully vindicate racial equal protection interests.
Could a similar shortfall exist between effects tests and the
thrust of the sixth amendment, causing the third motive also to
be relevant? The difference between the two motives may be one
of degree, but even this is doubtful. Except for the general due
process interest in examining any motive conflicting with the
Constitution, jury trial interests can be protected fully by heightening or by altering effects tests. The racial and the religious interests protected by the first and the fourteenth amendments are
different in kind from the general interest in a process of pure
motives. The discrete and insular minority clich,6 is one obvious
way of separating racial and religious interests from more general
interests in process. In a prescient early analysis of the equal protection clause, Professors Tussman and tenBroek observed that
there is little to discriminatory legislation cases other than questions of motive.2 2 It is doubtful that the same can be said for the
right to trial by jury.2 3
If any conclusion emerges from this brief discussion, it is that
one should not attempt too quick or too facile an answer to the
question whether motive should be considered in constitutional
adjudication. In particular, one should not extrapolate from an answer to the question whether one motive should or should not be
constitutionally relevant an answer to the question whether any
other motives should be. Unpraiseworthy motives may conflict
with many different constitutional limitations. These limitations
22. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L, REv.
341, 358 (1949).
23. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 141-42 & n.497. The line between cases in
which motive should matter and cases in which it should not may turn on whether
the constitutional provision at issue limits the scope of governmental power or
whether it limits the way in which this power is exercised. See id, at 139-46. Professor Tribe seems to have proposed a similar dividing line. L. TamE, AhiRicAN
CONSTITUmONAL LAw 229 (1978).
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protect such a variety of interests that one should not expect a
single answer to the motive question.
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